Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1997

Reading Holmes through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams
Dissent
Vincent A. Blasi
Columbia Law School, blasi@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Vincent A. Blasi, Reading Holmes through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1343 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3556

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

READING HOLMES THROUGH THE LENS
OF SCHAUER: THE ABRAMS DISSENT
Vincent Blasi*
Even the best scholars rarely persuade. Mostly, they illuminate.
They make us more discerning readers and interlocutors.
Here I want to illustrate how Frederick Schauer's work on the law
of free speech can help us to read what may be the single most influential judicial opinion ever written on that subject, Justice Holmes's
famous dissent in Abrams v. United States.' So far as I am aware,
Schauer has not produced anything like a line-by-line parsing of the
Holmes opinion. I claim nevertheless that a reader familiar with
Schauer's ideas is far better prepared on that account to understand
what Holmes is saying and suggesting. That is no small benefit, moreover, for the Abrams dissent has been given so many schematic, tendentious readings over the years2 that its actual argument is at risk of
being lost in the shuffle, despite Holmes's celebrity and the opinion's
canonical status.

I
To demonstrate how Schauer can help us read Holmes, I must
indulge in a time-honored ritual of First Amendment devotees and
quote in full the stirring final paragraph of the Abrams dissent
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as
Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School.
1 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
*

2 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEMKLEJOHN, PouTcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTTUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 29-50 (1965); CASS R. SUNSMIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
23-28 (1993); David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadingsin the
First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE LJ. 857 (1986); Stanley Fish, Fraughtwith Death:
Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1061, 1070-83
(1993); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1.
OF FREE SPEECH
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when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not
care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager
our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country. I wholly disagree with the argument
of the Government that the First Amendment left the common law
as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United States through many years
had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying
fines that it imposed. Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, "Congress
shall make no law. . abridging the freedom of speech." Of course
I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations,
which were all that were uttered here, but I regret that I cannot put
into more impressive words my belief that in their conviction upon
this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under
3
the Constitution of the United States.
Once the eloquence has been savored (and the false modesty
noted), the reader wonders whether Holmes can possibly mean what
he seems to be saying about "the best test of truth." Is he really so
cynical, or fatalistic? Is he asserting a Chicago-school level of faith in
markets combined with a willingness both to commodify truth and to
ignore the various sources of market failure that operate in the fleshand-blood society he is supposedly discussing? And even if Holmes
wishes to embrace such a mundane conception of truth, how then
does truth become "the only ground"4 of social organization and aspiration? Furthermore, how does the author of the quip "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
3 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31.
4

Id. at 630.
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Statics" 5 justify the position that the First Amendment enacts an extreme version of epistemological skepticism and/or moral relativism?
One possible response is to read Holmes as neither a borderline
cynic nor a model-building neoclassical economist but rather a pragmatist impressed by how free speech can foster a culture of productive
adaptation. 6 In this view, the reference to "the market"7-observe
that Holmes never employs the phrase "marketplace of ideas"-is not
meant to evoke anything so elegant and implausible as a fair procedure for determining society's finely calibrated, self-correcting cognitive equilibrium. Rather, the claim is simply that the human
understanding is eternally fluctuating and incomplete, and constantly
in need of inquisitive energy much the way commercial prosperity depends on entrepreneurial energy. In addition, Holmes's allusion to
Darwinian forces and his assertion that life is an experiment suggests
his embrace of the scientific method, with the implication that the
First Amendment represents a commitment by this society to test its
truths continually and revise them regularly.
The skepticism and the economic logic can be tamed in this way,
but the problem remains that the Abrams dissent reads too much like a
personal philosophy of no conceivable constitutional pedigree. One
searches for a reading of the opinion that is better grounded in the
text, tradition, and philosophy of the Constitution. At this point, the
work of Professor Schauer proves to be a most valuable resource.. .
In his.fine book Free Speech: A PhilosophicalEnquiry, Schauer observes that we cannot justify a high level of protection for free speech
simply by showing (if that can be done) that such a legal regime
would significantly advance the search for truth (however defined).
At least as crucial to the case for free speech is the proposition that
the search for truth has an exceptionally high priority.8 For any gain
in knowledge might come at a cost to security, privacy, social harmony, personal dignity, and a host of other goods. Arguments for
free speech that rely on claims about truth must be scrutinized as
much, Schauer says, for what they say about this question of priority as
for what they say about how speech improves understanding. 9
5 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6 What may well be the most important article ever written about Holmes's
thought explores his complicated connections to the pragmatist philosophies ofJohn
Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and William James, among others. See Thomas C.
Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989).
7 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 631.
8 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILosoPHIcAL ENQUIRY 33 (1982).
9 Id. at 29.
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By emphasizing the issue of priority, we can read the Abrams dissent in a new light. Notice that Holmes can be interpreted to be making a strong if cryptic claim about the priority of truth. After offering
his "best test of truth," he asserts "that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out," referring to the wishes of
those who "have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths."' 0
Truth (defined according to the test of the market) thus is a ground
for carrying out wishes, and indeed the "only ground" upon which this
can be done "safely."1 1
This sounds like an instrumental justification for the priority of
truth: truth (or knowledge, or enhanced understanding, or a "preferable epistemic state" as Schauer puts it' 2) is not so much an end in
itself as a means to some different end. Or at least the priority of truth,
which may be considered both an end in itself and a means to something else, derives from its instrumental function. Earlier in the same
sentence, moreover, Holmes specifies what end he thinks truth is instrumental to: "the ultimate good desired."1 3 We might be tempted to
think this noncommittal phrase says nothing at all, but the reference
to desires, combined with Holmes's later invocation of "wishes,"' 4 suggests that he views truth, and thus speech that aids the search for
truth, as instrumental to the satisfaction of a wide variety of wants.
That Holmes is characteristically capacious and non-judgmental about
the "ultimate good"' 5 that establishes the priority of truth is an important feature of his argument. For if the value of truth is that it helps
us to satisfy our desires, as various and conflicting as they may be,
truth is performing a function that is, in essence, political.
One might dispute this last step by ascribing to Holmes a much
more individualistic frame of reference. Thus, truth discovered by
means of unfettered discussion might be instrumental to the satisfaction of desires but only at the level of personal judgment, not that of
societal construction of norms and understandings. Collective wellbeing is not what he is concerned with, in this view. Hence it is foolish
to search the Abrams opinion for any kind of implicit politicaltheory, at
least not one that claims for free speech a distinctive political
function.
Such an attempt to turn Holmes into a libertarian is not consistent with his lifelong fascination with social forces and his visceral hos10 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630
11
12
13
14
15

Id.
supra note 8, at 18.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
Id.
Id.
SCHAUER,
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tility to assertions of individual right. Holmes was not at all averse to
the claims of collective authority. That is one reason why he rejected
the libertarian logic of the majority in Lochner v. New York' 6 and other
liberty-of-contract cases of that era.'7 Moreover, his terminology of
"power" and "competition" and "market" suggests the notion of a collective struggle toward collective outcomes' 8 Holmes may have valued speech partly for its capacity to facilitate individual life-planning
or identity formation (more likely, in his case, existential engagement),'9 but his argument in Abrams cannot properly be read to reflect an individualistic emphasis.
An alternative, equally mistaken reading would portray Holmes
not as a libertarian but as a "liberal" more concerned with process
than consequences. Stanley Fish has offered such an interpretation of
the Abrams dissent.20 A modicum of textual support for this view
might even be squeezed from the statement "that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out" were it to
be read with the stress on the word "that" rather than "truth."2 1 The
significance of the shift of emphasis is that the procedure of the market becomes itself a truth, perhaps not exactly an end in itself but
something at least as important as the contingent understandings it
produces. This reading invites us to reify the market, protect it
against distortions, perfect it, treat its purest form as an ideal, not to
serve any particular political objective but out of a blind faith in the
efficacy of the cognitive and normative outcomes it will generate.
Why should we read Holmes to exalt process so? Why should we
assume he is indifferent to political consequences? He was no reformer, to be sure, but he shared with the pragmatists of his day the
view that law is best understood in instrumentalist terms. 22 In what is
16 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908). For an excellent brief analysis of how Holmes's rejection of liberty-ofcontract claims fits with his respect for social forces and skepticism about rights, see
G. EDWARD WHrrE,JUSTICE

OLIVER WENDELL

HOLMES:

LAW AND THE INNER SELF

324-30

(1993).
18 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
19 The existential side of Holmes is best expressed in his succinct article, Natural
Law, which he published one year before he wrote the Abrams dissent. See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, NaturalLaw, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1918). This essay richly rewards
close reading by anyone who would interpret what Holmes says in Abrams.
20 See Fish, supra note 2, at 1076-77.
21 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
22 See Grey, supra note 6, at 806-07 (discussing this affinity between Holmes and
John Dewey). Richard Posner has noted Holmes's "pragmatic preference for analyzing law in terms of consequences rather than morally charged abstractions such as
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probably the most important statement of his legal philosophy, The
Path of the Law, 2 3 Holmes says:
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing'considerations of social advantage. The
duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial
aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very
ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often
24
unconscious.

Holmes was nothing like a neutrality-seeking, procedural liberal. The
Abrams opinion, as I read it, is much more about the substantive effects of political criticism and challenge than it is about process as a
measure of fairness or justice or wisdom. Despite his Olympian image, Holmes actually built his argument for free speech around a concern for political consequences.
This conclusion gains support from a little-noticed but significant
structural feature of the Abrams opinion. In the earlier Espionage Act
cases, Holmes, ever the common-lawjudge, had reached his repressive
results by arguing from concrete analogies. Surely the First Amendment does not prevent the government from punishing the false
shout of fire in a theater, at least when a panicky stampede ensues.2 5
So too the government must be able to regulate "words that may have
all the effect of force," as when a labor leader gives a signal to boycott.2 6 So too persuasion to murder can be made a crime. 2 7 In other

words, there is some speech we simply have to be able to regulate, and
thus "[ t] he question in every case" 28 is whether as a matter "of proximity and degree" 2 9 the speech at issue is analogous to those standard
instances of unprotected speech. The Abrams dissent proceeds from
concrete analogies too, but from the opposite direction. There is
some speech, Holmes suggests, that we simply have to have under the
First Amendment. He offers the example of the patriot who challenges the government's war production priorities, thereby in effect
'right' and 'duty."' See Richard A. Posner, Introductionto THE
(Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).

ESSENTIAL

HOLMES ix, ix

23 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Pathof Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897), reprinted
in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 160, (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
24 Id., reprintedin THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 160, 168 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).

25 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
26 Id.
27 See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (asserting that Hamilton and Madison never would have believed that "the counselling of a murder" is an
instance of constitutionally protected speech).
28 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
29 Id.

THE
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urging curtailment in some spheres.30 More generally Holmes says:
"Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the
country."31 In fact, Holmes here sounds very much like his young admirer and correspondent on the subject of free speech, Judge
Learned Hand, who argued in his famous Masses opinion that governing majorities gain their very authority from the fact that they are
exposed to continuing "hostile criticism." 32 Hand developed his approach to free speech from the premise that such hostile criticism
must be protected even when it may cause significant harm to the war
effort

33

Holmes, I suggest, borrowed from Hand on this point.

The claim that Holmes's argument from truth rests on a vision of
the political function of free speech is reinforced by his choice of a
term in the Abrams dissent that would otherwise seem out of Olace.
He says: "truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out."3 4 Why the concern for safety? To what risk does he

refer? I believe he is worried about the risk of desires being thwarted
by wielders of power who claim to control others in the name of values
other than truth, or in the name of some notion of truth measured by
means other than the open competition of ideas. His injunction
three sentences later that we be "eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions"3 5 employs the Madisonian rhetoric
of political distrust.36 Holmes is worried, it seems, about the exercise
of authority. The credential of the market, in this reading, is that it is
the most viable alternative to authoritative decree. The claim is modest but no less iniportant for that.
Here again, Professor Schauer's work on the First Amendment
helps us to appreciate how the argument from truth flows into the
30 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627.
31

Id. at 628.

32 See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917). The Hand-Holmes correspondence regarding free speech is reproduced and discussed in Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975).

33 For a more detailed explanation of Hand's approach see Vincent Blasi, Learned
Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v.

Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1990).
34 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
35

Id.

36 See, e.g., JAMES

MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS, && 2, 3, 15 (1785), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF
THE PoLrncAL THOUGHT OFJAMES MADISON 3; 10, 15-16 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973);
JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1799-1800), reprinted in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE PoLrmcAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 299,
330, 337-44 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
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argument from democracy. In his book he warns against the tendency to keep the standard rationales for free expression hermetically
compartmentalized, and he demonstrates specifically how the argu37
ments from truth and the arguments from democracy intersect.
Human fallibility, for example, is a major reason why the search for
understanding ought to be decentralized, continual, and a high priority. In few spheres is human fallibility so evident, and also potentially
so consequential, as in the domain of governance. An appreciation of
Schauer's work in this respect helps us to read Holmes in Abrams as
making a claim about the political function of the search for truth,
and particularly about the political dangers of not giving that search a
very high priority.
It is important that this reading of Holmes not be mistaken for an
argument from democracy akin to those offered by Alexander
Meiklejohn a half-century ago and by some prominent scholars today,
Owen Fiss and Gass Sunstein among them.3 8 That is, one cannot find
in the Abrams dissent support for the claim that free speech deserves
priority because it facilitates public deliberation about the common
good, on the model of the New England town meeting. Holmes liked
to view politics as a battle of forces, not a disinterested quest for collective wisdom.3 9 Meiklejohn correctly perceived this and savaged
4° Nor is the Holmesian rationale for
Holmes for it.
free speech built
upon the premise that in a democracy the distribution of political influence should satisfy some sort of equality norm, or that government
founded on the principle of consent must accord each of its citizens
4
equal concern and respect. '
37 See SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 34, 39, 45-46.
38 See OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 18 (1996);
note 2, at 24-28; SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 241-52.

MEIKLEJOHN,

supra

39 [I]n the last resort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his neighbors. And this is as true in legislation as in any other form of corporate action.

All that can be expected from modem improvements is that legislation should
easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accordance with the will of

the defacto supreme power in the community, and that the spread of an educated
sympathy should reduce the sacrifice of minorities to a minimum. But whatever
body may possess the supreme power for the moment is certain to have interests
inconsistent with others which have competed unsuccessfully. The more powerful interests must be more or less reflected in legislation; which, like every other
device of man or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest.
The Gas-Stoker's Strike, 7 Am. L. REV. 582, 583 (1873), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES 120, 120-23 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
40 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 2, at 60-70.
41 Regarding Holmes's disdain for equality as a political norm see WHrrE, supra
note 17, at 343, 391-92. He once labeled equal protection claims "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
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Some persons might question whether any argument for free
speech from democracy can remain aloof from these notions of public
deliberation and equal civic status, and thus might conclude either
that Holmes cannot be making a democratic process argument or that
he is willy-nilly complicit in the utopian tum of contemporary free
speech theory. Professor Schauer, however, has shown how the project of controlling the exercise of power need not collapse into a quest
for the just society, and how the argument for free speech is strongest
when it steers clear of strong claims relating to collective rationality
and broad-based participation. 42 The article I consider his most probing on the subject of free speech, The Role of the People in FirstAmendment Theoy,4 3 is notable for its patient and perceptive elaboration of
the many different roles, not all of them deliberative or highly participatory, that "the people" can play in a government that purports to
derive its legitimacy from the phenomenon of consent.
I contend that the Abrams dissent builds on a sophisticated conception of the role of "the people" in the system of government enacted by the Constitution. In that regard, Holmes's argument aspires
to a constitutional pedigree that would be conspicuously lacking were
his interpretation of the First Amendment to rest on nothing more
than his own skeptical epistemology. Holmes explicitly claims such a
pedigree when he says of the view that market-determined truth is the
only ground on which to base governance: "That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution."4
To support this conclusion Holmes invokes not philosophic logic
but constitutional experience. He argues that the most dramatic instance of the government asserting the power to define political truth,
the Sedition Act of 1798, was utterly repudiated: "I had conceived that
the United States through many years had shown its repentance for
the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed." 45 The
Madisonian connection can scarcely be missed, particularly in light of
the fact that earlier that year Holmes had read an amicus brief filed in
the Debs case by the noted civil liberties attorney Gilbert Roe which
built its argument around Madison's great Virginia Report challenging the constitutionality of the Sedition Act.4 6
42 SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 43-44.
43 Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 761 (1986).
44 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
45 Id.
46 Brief of Gilbert E. Roe, As Amicus Curiae, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1918) (No. 714).
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The tendency to downplay the political distrust aspect of the
Abrams opinion might trace to something Holmes says just after he
states what is "the theory of our Constitution." 47 He says of the Constitution: "It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. ' 48 Any proposition that derives from such a sweeping claim about the nature of "all
life" hardly seems a promising building block for a positivistic argument of constitutional pedigree. However, when we consider the position (more precisely, the mentality) that Holmes is challenging in his
dissent, the assertion that the Constitution is "an experiment" becomes more pointed, and more pertinent to an argument from democratic premises.
Unlike its counterpart of the year before, the Espionage Act of
1918 was really a sedition act. By its explicit terms the law made it a
crime to publish "disloyal" language or language intended to cause
"disrepute" as regards the form of government of the United States or
49
the Constitution or the flag or the uniform of the Army or Navy.
Two of the four counts on which the Abrams defendants were convicted charged violations of this provision. 50 The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on the basis of the two other counts, for
publishing language intended to encourage resistance to the United
States and urging the curtailment of the production of ordnance and
ammunition. 5 1 Even on those counts, Holmes concluded in light of
the paltry evidence of harm and the severity of the sentences (twenty
years for three of the defendants, fifteen years for the other) that the
defendants had been punished "for the creed they avow." 5 2 One plausible explanation for why Holmes failed to exhibit the least sympathy
for free speech claimants until the Abrams case is that only then did he
perceive the prosecution to be in essence an effort to punish ideas as
such-to punish, that is, not for the "substantive evil"5 3 of material
interference with the war effort, but for sedition.
The rationale for punishing sedition goes beyond the claim that a
sovereign state must be able to protect itself against material dangers
to its existence or efficacious functioning. The fundamental claim is
that a sovereign state must be able to protect its good name and must
be able to control those who would weaken the attachment or trust of
its citizens by besmirching that name. What is at stake is general be47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
Id.
Espionage Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 629.
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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liefs, even when the state's interest in its citizens' beliefs is driven
largely by instrumental concerns. Central to Holmes's view of the
First Amendment, I submit, is the proposition that false or dangerous
general beliefs about government can never constitute "substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." -4
One general belief that will always arouse the interest of officials
relates to the acceptable methods for bringing about political change.
The anarchists and revolutionary socialists of the Abrams era were despised and reviled by many good patriots for their refusal to abide by
the principle of peaceful change by means of the ballot.5 5 These radicals preached change by other, extra-constitutional, sometimes violent
means. How then could they invoke the Constitution of the United
States as a shield for their advocacy of its destruction?
In this view, the Constitution is the charter that establishes the
rules of political change.5 6 It does not preclude change but rather
provides for it. The Constitution, so understood, is not a repository of
permanent principles of governance-with the single exception that
it represents a permanent commitment to the principle that its principles be changed only by peaceful, prescribed methods. Any political
philosophy that denies this one procedural truth cannot be a part of
the "freedom of speech" marked off by the Constitution for extraordinary protection, so the argument goes.
Holmes will have none of this. He refuses to view the Constitution as freezing in place a particular philosophy of political change.
The Constitution, in his view, is not a repository even of this one fundamental principle. Rather, it is "an experiment, as all life is an experiment."5 7 It is a "fighting faith,"5 8 one he himself had been
wounded three times fighting for, but one nevertheless in need of
being tested continually by a variety of means, not excluding the critical scrutiny and revolutionary rhetoric of those who would practice
sedition.
Constitution worship was in vogue when Holmes wrote the
Abrams dissent,59 and one can imagine his glee when it occurred to
him to call this idol an "experiment,"60 certain (he implies) eventually
54 Id. (emphasis added).
55 See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAInHs: THE Abrams Case, the Supreme
Court, and Free Speech 29, 31-32, 100-102, 159 (1987).
56 For an account of this position, held by Woodrow Wilson among many others,
see ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LosT PROMISE op PROGRESSMSM 126 (1994).
57 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
58 Id.
59 See EISENACH, supra note 56.
60 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
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to be proved inefficacious and abandoned. Interestingly, a far more
sober-minded, temperamentally less provocative constitutional theorist preceded Holmes in refusing to treat preservation of the existing
constitution as the fundamental principle of sovereignty. In his Virginia Report, Madison points out that had it been exercised during
the 1780s, the power to punish for sedition might have left the United
States "languishing" under the "infirmities" of an inadequate constitu61
tional regime, the Articles of Confederation.
Placing at the center of the argument the reference to the historical repudiation of the Sedition Act helps to reconcile the Abrams dissent with Holmes's Darwinian respect for dominant forces, including
legislative majorities. 62 What Alexander Bickel would later call the
counter-majoritarian difficulty of judicial review63 was surely a factor
in Holmes's earlier refusal to invalidate convictions of prominent socialists under the Espionage Act of 1917 for routine expressions of war
criticism. 64 Professor Schauer has demonstrated that the counter-

majoritarian difficulty presents a serious challenge to anyone who
would justify free speech in the name of democracy because the
majoritarian preference may be to have less speech. 65 Anticipating an
argument later developed suggestively by Schauer in response to this
challenge, 6 6 Holmes finds a way in Abrams to invalidate the regulatory
preference of the congressional majority that passed the 1918 sedition
law. He does this so as to respect and empower a different and more
fundamental "majority," the perpetually nascent forces of political displacement. Recognition that in the last analysis sovereignty resides
67
with those forces "is the theory of our Constitution."
II
The Schauer oeuvre can help us to understand not only the constitutional premises of the Abrams dissent but also the limits that
Holmes articulates. In a passage too often ignored, Holmes specifies
that "I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations,
which were all that were uttered here."68 Nothing he says in Abrams,
61

See THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OFJAMES
(Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
See supra note 39.
See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962).
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64 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
65 See SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 40-41; Schauer, supra note 43, at 778-85.
66
67

See Schauer, supra note 43, at 785-87.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.

68 Id. at 631.
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by his own injunction, applies to regulations of speech predicated on
misstatements of verifiable fact, such as the standard action for defamation. Likewise, disclosures of sensitive information remain outside
the ambit of Holmes's argument for free speech, however much such
disclosures might contribute to public debate or the checking of government power. The graphic depictions of pornographers, even the
soft-core variety, also appear not to be the type of speech that Holmes
insists must be tested in the competition of the market.
Schauer has observed that arguments for free speech from truth
tend to be fatally overbroad. The value of truth, the priority it deserves, indeed the very meaning of the concept and the best procedure for ascertaining it, varies radically depending on whether we are
considering propositions of morality, logic, political efficacy, theology,
empirical fact, or beauty, to name only a few categories. The desirability of the market test for truth depends to a great extent, says Schauer,
on the reliability of alternative means of verification and (perhaps
even more important) falsification. 69 Schauer goes on to conclude
that what he calls the "survival" or "consensus" theory of truth-by
which he means the Holmesian claim that whatever is produced by
the process of unregulated discussion (i.e., the competition of the
market) is for that reason alone "true"-is defensible, if at all, only in
the realm of political and moral opinion. Schauer disputes the validity of the market test of truth in other domains, including the empirical. 70 So too, it turns out, might Holmes.
The Abrams opinion not only seeks to protect a limited range of
speech, but also seeks to protect that speech against only one type of
regulation. Holmes states explicitly that the highly protective clearand-imminent-danger standard he embraces should apply only "where
private rights are not concerned." 71 Holmes in Abrams is erecting a
bulwark against governmental suppression of speech in the name of
public order, national security, political identity, and the like-concerns sounding in sedition, one might say. Wholly different, he implies, is the appropriate First Amendment standard when speech is
regulated in order to protect or compensate specific persons.
We can read Holmes here as offering an embryonic version of an
argument developed recently by Professor Schauer. The First Amendment analysis of private civil damage actions for harms caused by
speech must be "uncoupled," Schauer contends, from the doctrinal
tradition developed in disputes over criminal sanctions and civil disa69 See SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 24-25, 30-33.
70 Rd. at 31-33.
71 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628.
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bilities designed to protect governmental interests. 72 The costs and
benefits of speech and the risks of regulation are sufficiently distinct
in these different categories of cases that wisdom does not lie in lumping them together. 73 Neither Schauer nor Holmes doubts the need
for a highly protective constitutional standard limiting the power of
government to regulate speech. Both, however, seek to confine the
range of free speech disputes that is subject to such a demanding
standard.
Schauer's "uncoupling" thesis derives from his comprehensive exploration of the nature of rules. 74 That exploration has yielded a perspective on the formulation of First Amendment doctrine that might
go far to answer the hardest question one can ask about the Abrams
dissent: How, if at all, does Holmes's philosophy of free speech as articulated in his memorable musings about truth, competition, the
market, experimentation, and sedition justify the operational legal
standard of clear and imminent danger? Specifically, why should
Holmes care so much about the temporal dimension, the time frame
within which a particular utterance causes harm? Why not the
probability of harm, whatever the time frame? Or the magnitude of
the harm? Or the balance between the harms and benefits generated
by the speech in question?
According to Schauer, if we ask of a rule such as clear and imminent danger that it decide each case to which it is applied just the way
the formulator of the rule would have preferred the case to be decided under an ad hoc procedure, we miss the whole point of a rule.75

As a matter of ad hoc assessment, there is little to be said for tolerating
speech that is highly likely to cause harm in the indefinite future.
Consider a speaker today who tells a television audience that doctors
who perform abortions are murderers and that killing such a doctor
would be a morally justifiable act that would result in a net saving of
lives. I take it that Holmes's emphasis on imminence would result in
protecting such speech under the First Amendment, but is that the
result that ought to follow from his general discussion in Abrams of the
reasons for free speech?
Many students of Holmes would say "yes," on the ground that the
anti-abortion moralist can be refuted in the marketplace of ideas if
only there is time to do so before the speech leads to action. Indeed,
72 See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321 (1992).
73 Id.
74 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE (1991).

75 See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv.
9, 9-14 (1989).
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Holmes can be read to support this interpretation when he urges toleration except in "the emergency that makes it immediately danger76
ous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time."
The problem with this rationale for the imminence test is that it is
based on a very crude generalization, and Holmes is best known as a
legal thinker for his cautious and sophisticated approach to the technique of generalization.7 7 The sufficiency of counter-speech "depends upon the circumstances,"7 8 and those circumstances include
many more variables than simply the time available for refutation. For
example, those who would refute the televised assertion that the murder of an abortion doctor can be morally justified would have no idea
to whom they ought to direct their counter-speech. Few opponents of
abortion would be influenced by such an extreme argument, but
which few? Even if we ignore, as Holmes never did, the great degree
to which our beliefs are determined by our social positions, adventitious experiences, and psychological needs-even if we assume, as
Holmes never did, listeners who respond only to rational argumentsthe efficacy of refutation still turns on whether the counter-message
comes to the attention of all the persons who were swayed by the,original idea. The competitive market in ideas-remember Holmes never
called it a marketplace-functions nothing like the New York Stock
Exchange, and to appreciate why that is so one could hardly do better
than to consult Holmes's many observations on the nature of belief
formation.7 9 Perhaps that is why he says we should leave the correc76

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.

77 "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). F or a nuanced discussion of Holmes
on formalism, generalization, and pragmatism see Grey, supra note 6, at 816-26.
78 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
79 Representative is his paragraph on the subject in the essay NaturalLaur.
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things
that were not so. If I may quote myself again, property, friendship, and truth

have a common root in time. One can not be wrenched from the rocky
crevices into which one has grown for many years without feeling that one is
attacked in one's life. What we most love and revere generally is determined
by early associations. I love granite rocks and barberry bushes, no doubt

because with them were my earliest joys that reach back through the past
eternity of my life. But while one's experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they came to be so leaves

one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about something else. And this again means scepticism. Not that one's belief or love
does not remain. Not that we would not fight and die for it if important-

we all, whether we know it or not, are fighting to make the kind of a world
that we should like-but that we have learned to recognize that others will
fight and die to make a different world, with equal sincerity or belief. Deep-
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don of evil counsels not to "counter-argument" or "refutation" but to
"time."8 0

A justification for the imminence test that is more persuasive
than the time-for-refutation rationale is suggested by Professor
Schauer's theory of the "Second-Best First Amendment."8' To enjoy
the various benefits of a rule we must settle for a pattern of outcomes
that is less satisfying, in terms of our purest and most fundamental
notions of value (including the value of free speech), than we would
get if an ideal decision maker decided each case individually in terms
of those values. The imminence test is a rule that produces such a less
than satisfying pattern of outcomes. So, what are the benefits of the
regime of rules in this particular area of law? Rules can foster predictability but Schauer questions whether disputes over free speech are
such that predictability should count for a great deal.8 2 Few putative
speakers, it seems, depend on a high level of foresight concerning
case outcomes in order to plan their endeavors. Schauer observes,
however, that "rules serve other purposes as well, and one of those,
the disabling of certain classes of decision makers from making certain kinds of decisions, does appear especially pertinent to thinking
83
about freedom of speech as a rule.1
I suggest that the best reason to require a clear probability of
imminent harm before a person can be convicted for expressing an
seated preferences can not be argued about-you can not argue a man into
liking a glass of beer-and therefore, when differences are sufficiently far
reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him have his way. But
that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, so far as it appears, his
grounds are just as good as ours.
Holmes, supra note 19, at 40-41.
See also Holmes's letter to Harold Laski ofJan. 11, 1929, reproduced in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 107 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
[W]hen I say that a thing is true I only mean that I can't help believing itbut I have no grounds for assuming that my can't helps are cosmic can't
helps and some reasons for thinking otherwise. I therefore define the truth
as the system of my intellectual limitations-there being a tacit reference to
what I bet is or will be the prevailing can't help of the majority of that part of
the world that I count. The ultimate, even humanly speaking, is a mystery.
Id.
80 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
81 See Schauer, supra note 75. Before he undertook his ambitious study of the
concept of rules, Schauer embraced the time-for-refutation rationale for the dearand-imminent danger test. See ScHAuER, supra note 8, at 30. He may still hold to that
view, but I think his recent work can help us to find a better explanation for the
imminence requirement.
82 Schauer, supra note 75, at 14.
83 Id.
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opinion is to disable regulators .from using their authority to punish
ideas as such, to persecute defendants for "the creed they avow."8 4 As
a matter of logic, of course, a regulatory rationale based on a prediction of non-imminent material harm need not entail any kind of hostility to the speaker's ideas as such, only to the anticipated
consequences of those ideas. But, "[tihe life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience." 85 And experience tells us that the
power to punish speech will be abused, as Holmes certainly believed it
had been in Abrams, if all the prosecution must show is a plausible
scenario of eventual harm. Absent a demanding causation rule such
as an imminence test, a rule so demanding that it permits a reviewing
court to declare an asserted causal connection downright implausible,
de facto convictions for sedition are too likely to occur. That, I believe, is the relationship Holmes perceived between his artificially narrow danger test-strategically tightened on the occasion of Abrams-and his theoretical remarks tying the market test of truth to the historical rejection of the Sedition Act. Clear and imminent danger is a rule
designed to function exactly the way Professor Schauer thinks a rule
in the realm of the First Amendment ought to work.
'II
The "marketplace of ideas" has come to stand for either a simplistic and complacent optimism about the pattern of beliefs that will result from a regime of non-regulation of speech, or a process ideal with
which to condemn unequal patterns of communicative opportunity
and ideological influence. Neither version of the metaphor captures
much of what the First Amendment is about, and certainly not what
Holmes was about. If only we could free ourselves from the spell of
this overblown metaphor we would discover a Holmes whose views regarding free speech mesh rather well with the Madisonian underpinnings of the First Amendment. We would discover a Holmes who
could second Schauer when he says: "Freedom of speech is based in
large part on a distrust of the ability of government to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of governmental determinations of truth
and falsity, an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a
somewhat deeper distrust of governmental power in a more general
6
sense."8
84 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919).
85 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1963).
86 ScHAutR, supranote 8, at 86. With characteristic (indeed Holmesian) aversion
to intellectual stasis, in his more recent work Schauer has explored whether we ought
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Holmes and Schauer have much in common but that does not
mean that Professor Schauer will find persuasive the interpretation of
the Abrams dissent that I have developed with the help of his ideas.
My guess is he will not; his passing references to Holmes's arguments
regarding free speech are largely distancing.8 7 To see one's work put
to unauthorized use is, however, the lot of the best scholars. Good
ideas take on lives of their own. No genuinely inquisitive person, and
certainly not Fred Schauer, would want it any other way.

to distrust the way we use the concept of distrust. See Frederick Schauer, The Calculus
of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653 (1991).
87 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supranote 8, at 20; Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value
of Truth, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 699, 705 (1991).

